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Abstrat
It is well known that unonditionally seure bit ommitment is impossible even in the
quantum world. In this paper a weak variant of quantum bit ommitment, introdued
independently by Aharonov et al. [2℄ and Hardy and Kent [8℄ is investigated. In this
variant, the parties require some nonzero probability of deteting a heating, i.e. if Bob,
who ommits a bit b to Alie, hanges his mind during the revealing phase then Alie
detets the heating with a positive probability (we all this property binding); and if Alie
gains information about the ommitted bit before the revealing phase then Bob disovers
this with positive probability (sealing). In our paper we give quantum bit ommitment
sheme that is simultaneously binding and sealing and we show that if a heating gives
ε advantage to a maliious Alie then Bob an detet the heating with a probability
Ω(ε2). If Bob heats then Alie's probability of deteting the heating is greater than
some xed onstant λ > 0. This improves the probabilities of heating detetions shown
by Hardy and Kent and the sheme by Aharonov et al. who presented a protool that is
either binding or sealing, but not simultaneously both.
To onstrut a heat sensitive quantum bit ommitment sheme we use a protool for a
weak quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer (
(
2
1
)
-OT). In this version, similarly as in
the standard denition, Alie has initially seret bits a0, a1 and Bob has a seret seletion
bit i and if both parties are honest they solve the
(
2
1
)
-OT problem fullling the standard
seurity requirements. However, if Alie is dishonest and she gains some information
about the seret seletion bit then the probability that Bob omputes the orret value is
proportionally small. Moreover, if Bob is dishonest and he learns something about both
bits, then he is not able to gain full information about one of them.
1 Introdution
In bit ommitment protool Bob ommits a bit b to Alie in suh a way that Alie learns
nothing (in an information theoreti sense) about b during this phase and later on, in the
revealing time, Bob annot hange his mind. It is well known that unonditionally seure
bit ommitment is impossible even when the parties use quantum ommuniation protools
([10, 11℄). Thus, muh eort has been foused on shemes using some weakened seurity
assumptions.
In a weak variant of quantum bit ommitment, introdued independently by Aharonov et al. [2℄
and Hardy and Kent [8℄, the protool should guarantee that if one party heats then the other
has good probability of deteting the mistrustful party. Speaking more preisely, we require
that if Bob hanges his mind during the revealing phase then Alie detets the heating with
1
a positive probability (we all this property binding) and if Alie learns information about the
ommitted bit before the revealing time then Bob disovers the leakage of information with
positive probability (sealing property).
In [8℄ Hardy and Kent give protool that is simultaneously sealing and binding and prove
that if Alie (Bob) uses a strategy giving ε > 0 advantage then Bob (Alie, resp.) an detet
the heating with a probability stritly greater then 0. The authors do not analyze, however,
the quantitative dependene of the probability on ε. In [2℄ Aharonov et al. present a similar
protool to that proposed in [8℄ suh that after depositing phase either Alie or Bob hallenges
the other party and (1) when Alie asks Bob to reveal b and Bob inuenes the value with
advantage ε then she detets the heating with probability Ω(ε2) and (2) when Bob hallenges
Alie to return the depositing qubit and Alie predits b with advantage ε then Bob detets
the heating with probability Ω(ε2). Thus the protool is either binding or sealing, but not
simultaneously both (the authors therefore all the protool a quantum bit esrow). Aharonov
et al. left open whether simultaneous binding and sealing an be ahieved.
In our paper we give the rst, up to our knowledge, QBC sheme that is simultaneously
binding and sealing suh that if Alie's heating gives ε advantage then Bob an detet the
heating with a probability whih is Ω(ε2). If Bob heats (anyhow) then Alie's probability
of deteting the heating is greater than some xed onstant λ > 0, i.e. when Bob deides
to set the value b to 0 or to 1 and in the revealing time wants to hange his mind then for
any strategy Bob uses the probability that Alie detets this attak is greater than λ. To
onstrut suh sheme we use a protool for a weak variant of quantum oblivious transfer.
1.1 Our Contribution
In the one-out-of-two oblivious transfer problem (
(2
1
)
-OT, for short) Alie has initially two
seret bits a0, a1 and Bob has a seret seletion bit i. The aim of a
(2
1
)
-OT protool is dislosing
the seleted bit ai to Bob, in suh a way that Bob gains no further information about the
other bit and Alie learns nothing at all. The problem has been proposed by Even et al. [7℄, as
a generalization of Rabin's notion for oblivious transfer [12℄. Oblivious transfer is a primitive
of entral importane partiularly in seure two-party and multi-party omputations. It is
well known ([9, 4℄) that
(
2
1
)
-OT an be used as a basi omponent to onstrut protools
solving more sophistiated tasks of seure omputations suh as two-party oblivious iruit
evaluation. Several seure OT protools has been proposed in the literature [3, 5, 6℄ however,
even in quantum world, there exists no unonditionally seure protool for
(2
1
)
-OT (see e.g.
[11℄).
In this paper we dene a weak variant of one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. Similarly as in the
standard denition, in a weak
(2
1
)
-OT protool Alie has initially seret bits a0, a1 and Bob has
a seret seletion bit i and if both parties are honest1 they solve the
(2
1
)
-OT problem fullling
the standard requirements. However if Alie is dishonest and she gains some information
about the seret seletion bit then the probability that Bob omputes the orret value is
proportionally dereased. Moreover, if Bob is dishonest he an learn about both bits, but if
he does so then he is not able to gain full information about one of them.
In the paper we present a weak
(
2
1
)
-OT protool whih, speaking informally (preise denitions
will be given in Setion 3), fullls the following properties.
• If both Alie having initially bits a0, a1 and Bob having bit i are honest then Bob learns
the seleted bit ai, but he gains no further information about the other bit and Alie
learns nothing.
1
We say that a party is honest if it never deviate from the given protool.
2
• If Bob is honest and has a bit i and Alie learns i with advantage ε then for all
a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1} the probability that Bob omputes the orret value ai, when the protool
ompletes, is at most 1− Ω(ε2).
• If Alie is honest and has bits a0, a1 then for every i ∈ {0, 1} it is true that if Bob an
predit the value a1−i with advantage ε then the probability that Bob learns orretly
ai is at most 1− Ω(ε2).
The protool an be used e.g. by the mistrustful parties for whih omputing the orret result
of
(2
1
)
-OT is muh more preferential than gaining addition information. In this paper we show
an appliation of the protool for parties who require some nonzero probability of deteting a
heating. Let us onsider the following bit ommitment protool, where v := OT ((a0, a1), i)
means, for short, that Alie having initially a0, a1 and Bob knowing i perform the weak
(2
1
)
-OT
protool and when the protool ompletes Bob knows the result v.
Protool 1 (Cheat sensitive QBC) B ommits bit b;
• Depositing phase
1. A hooses randomly bits a0, a1, a2, a3; B hooses randomly bits b
′
and c;
2. A and B ompute
v0 := OT ((a0, a1), b
′); v1 := OT ((a2, a3), b) if c = 0 or
v0 := OT ((a0, a1), b); v1 := OT ((a2, a3), b
′) if c = 1.
3. B reveals c.
• Revealing phase B reveals b;
◦ Sealing test: A sends to B a2c, a2c+1; B rejets when vc 6= OT ((a2c, a2c+1), b′).
◦ Binding test: B sends to A v1−c; A rejets when v1−c 6= OT ((a2−2c), a3−2c), b).
One of the main results of this paper says that using our weak
(2
1
)
-OT protool, the bit
ommitment protool above has the following properties: (1) If both Alie and Bob are
honest, then before revealing time Alie gains no information about b and at the revealing
phase both Bob and Alie aept; (2) if Alie learns b with advantage ε then Bob detets
heating with probability Ω(ε2), and (3) if Bob tries to hange b during the revealing phase
then for any strategy he uses the probability that Alie detets the heating is greater than
some positive onstant.
The paper is organized as follows. In Setion 2 some basi quantum preliminaries are given.
In Setion 3 we dene formally properties of a weak
(2
1
)
-OT protool and prove that the given
sheme fullls the properties. Setion 4 gives formal denition of binding and sealing and
proves that Protool 1 is simultaneously binding and sealing.
2 Preliminaries
The model of two-party omputation we use in this paper is essentially the same as dened
in [2℄. We assume that the reader is already familiar with basis of quantum ryptography
(see [2℄ for an exemplary summary of results that will be used in the following).
Let |0〉,|1〉 be an enoding of lassial bits in our omputational (perpendiular) basis. Let
|0×〉 = 1√2(|0〉 − |1〉), |1×〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) be an enoding of lassial bits in diagonal basis.
By Rα, α ∈ {0, 12 , 1}, we denote the unitary operation of rotation by an angle of α ·pi/2. More
formally:
Rα :=
(
cos(α · pi2 ) sin(α · pi2 )
− sin(α · pi2 ) cos(α · pi2 )
)
3
We should note that this operation allows us to exhange between the bit enoding in per-
pendiular and in diagonal basis. Moreover, by applying R1 we an ip the value of the bit
enoded in any of those two bases.
For a mixed quantum state ρ and a measurement O on ρ, let ρO denote the lassial dis-
tribution on the possible results obtained by measuring ρ aording to O, i.e. ρO is some
distribution p1, . . . , pt where pi denotes the probability that we get result i. We use L1-norm
to measure distane between two probability distributions p = (p1, . . . , pt) and q = (q1, . . . , qt)
over {1, 2, . . . , t}: |p− q|1 = 12
∑t
i=1 |pi − qi|.
Let ||A||t = tr(
√
A†A), where tr(A) denotes trae of matrix A. A fundamental theorem gives
us a bound on L1-norm for the probability distributions on the measurement results:
Theorem 1 (see [1℄) Let ρ0, ρ1 be two density matries on the same Hilbert spae H. Then
for any generalized measurement O |ρO0 − ρO1 |1 ≤ 12 ||ρ0 − ρ1||t. This bound is tight and the
orthogonal measurement O that projets a state on the eigenvetors of ρ0 − ρ1 ahieves it.
A well-known result states that if |φ1〉, |φ2〉 are pure states, then || |φ1〉〈φ1| − |φ2〉〈φ2| ||t =
2
√
1− |〈φ1|φ2〉|2.
Lemma 1 Suppose Bob has a bit b s.t. Pr[b = 0] = 1/2 and let Alie generate a state with
two quantum registers. Assume she sends the seond register to Bob, then Bob depending
on b makes some transformation on his part and sends the result bak to Alie. Denote
by ρ0 density matrix of the resulting state for b = 0 and by ρ1 density matrix of the state
for b = 1. Then for any measurement O Alie makes and a value v Alie learns we have
Prb∈R{0,1}[v = b] ≤ 1/2 +
|ρO
0
−ρO
1
|1
2 .
The proof of this lemma follows by some straight forward alulations and will be skipped
in this extended abstrat. We will use some obvious variations of this lemma to bound the
advantage of Alie resp. Bob in what will follow.
3 Weak Oblivious Transfer
In this setion we give the formal denition of the weak
(
2
1
)
-OT protool and then present
protool for this problem.
Denition 1 We say that a two-party quantum protool between Alie and Bob is a (δ, ε)-weak(
2
1
)
-OT protool if the following requirements hold.
• If both Alie depositing initially bits a0, a1 and Bob having bit i are honest then Bob
learns the seleted bit ai but in suh a way that he gains no further information about
the other bit and Alie learns nothing.
• Whenever Bob is honest and has a seletion bit i, with Pr[i = 0] = 1/2, then for every
strategy used by Alie, every value i′ Alie learns about i and for any value a′ Bob learns
at the end of the omputation it holds that for all a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}
if Pri∈R{0,1}[i
′ = i] ≥ 1/2 + δ then Pri∈R{0,1}[a′ = ai] ≤ 1− ε.
• Whenever Alie is honest and deposits bits a0, a1, with Pr[ai = 0] = 1/2, then for every
strategy used by Bob, all values a′0, a
′
1 Bob learns about a0, a1, resp. it holds that for all
i ∈ {0, 1} if Pra0,a1∈R{0,1}[a′1−i = a1−i] ≥ 1/2 + δ then Pra0,a1∈R{0,1}[a′i = ai] ≤ 1− ε.
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Protool 2 (
(2
1
)
-OT funtion) Input A : a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}, B : i ∈ {0, 1}; Output B : ai.
1. A hooses randomly α ∈R {0, 12} and h ∈R {0, 1} and sends to B:
Rα|a1 ⊕ h〉 ⊗Rα|a0 ⊕ h〉
2. B reeives |Φ1〉 ⊗ |Φ0〉, hooses randomly β ∈R {0, 1} and sends Rβ|Φi〉 bak to A.
3. A reeives |Φ〉, omputes R−1α |Φ〉, measures the state in omputational basis obtaining the
result n and sends m = n⊕ h to B.
4. B reeives m and omputes ai = m⊕ β.
Here, as usually, ⊗ denotes xor. Note that this protool omputes (21)-OT orretly if both
parties are honest. We will now fous on the question whether Protool 2 still retains seurity
if we use it against maliious parties. The following theorem follows from Lemma 2 and 3
whih will be proven in the remaining part of this setion:
Theorem 2 Protool 2 is (O( 2
√
ε), ε)-weak
(2
1
)
-OT protool.
3.1 Maliious Alie
Lemma 2 Let Alie and Bob perform Protool 2 and assume Bob is honest and deposits a
bit i, with Pr[i = 0] = 1/2. Then for every strategy used by Alie, every value i′ Alie learns
about i and for any value a′ Bob learns at the end of the omputation it holds that for all
a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1} if Pri∈R{0,1}[a′ = ai] ≥ 1− ε then Pri∈R{0,1}[i′ = i] ≤ 1/2 + 16
√
ε.
Proof: Any heating strategy A of Alie an be desribed as preparing some state |Φ〉 =∑
x∈{0,1}2 |vx, x〉, sending the two rightmost qubits to Bob and perform some measurement
{H0,H1,H2,H3} on this what she gets bak after Bob's round, where H0,H1,H2, H3 are four
pairwise orthogonal subspaes being a division of whole Hilbert spae that omes into play,
suh that, for l, k = 0, 1, if our measurement indiates the outome orresponding to H2k+l
then it reets Alie's belief that i = l and that the message m = k should be sent to Bob.
Assume now, that a0 ⊕ a1 = 0. We should note that in this ase m ⊕ a0 = β. So Alie,
in order to ensure the orret result of the protool, has to indiate the value of β. Let
|S〉 = |v00, 00〉+ |v11, 11〉, |A〉 = |v01, 01〉+ |v10, 10〉. That is, |S〉 is a part of the state that is
symmetri with respet to qubits being sent to Bob and |A〉 is the rest being anti-symmetri.
Let ρa,b be a density matrix of Alie's system after Bob's round, orresponding to i = a and
β = b. After some alulations we get:
ρ0,0 =
∑
x=(x1,x2)∈{0,1}2 |vxx1〉〈vxx1|
+|v000〉〈v101|+ |v101〉〈v000|+ |v111〉〈v010|+ |v010〉〈v111|
ρ0,1 =
∑
x=(x1,x2)∈{0,1}2 |vxx1〉〈vxx1|
−|v001〉〈v100| − |v100〉〈v001| − |v110〉〈v011| − |v011〉〈v110|
ρ1,0 =
∑
x=(x1,x2)∈{0,1}2 |vxx2〉〈vxx2|
+|v000〉〈v011|+ |v011〉〈v000|+ |v111〉〈v100|+ |v100〉〈v111|
ρ1,1 =
∑
x=(x1,x2)∈{0,1}2 |vxx2〉〈vxx2|
−|v001〉〈v010| − |v010〉〈v001| − |v110〉〈v101| − |v101〉〈v110| .
where xt means ipping bit xt, i.e. xt = 1− xt.
We look rst onto possibilities of Alie's dishonest behaviour. In order to heat, Alie has to
distinguish between density matries γl =
1
2ρl,0 +
1
2ρl,1, where γl orresponds to i = l. By
examination of the dierene of those matries we get after some alulations that:
γ0 − γ1 = 1
2
|VS0〉〈VA1|+ 1
2
|VA1〉〈VS0| − 1
2
|VS1〉〈VA0| − 1
2
|VA0〉〈VS1|
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where |VS〉 = |v00〉 + |v11〉 and |VA〉 = |v10〉 − |v01〉. We an easily adapt Lemma 1 to show
that the advantage δ of Alie is at most
∑3
l=0 σl where
σl = |tr(Hl(γ0 − γ1)Hl†)| ≤
∑
j∈{0,1}
1
2 |tr(Hl(|VS(j − 1)〉〈VAj|+ |VAj〉〈VS(j − 1)|)Hl†)|
≤ ∑j∈{0,1}(|〈Olj |VAj〉| · |〈VS(1− j)|Olj〉|)
≤ ∑j∈{0,1} |〈Olj |VAj〉|
and |Olj〉 is an orthogonal, normalized projetion of |VAj〉 onto subspae Hl. The seond
inequality is true beause we have tr(Hl|VAj〉〈ψ|Hl†) = 〈Olj |VAj〉〈ψ|Olj〉 for every state |ψ〉.
Let jl be the index for whih |〈Oljl |VAjl〉| ≥ |〈Ol1−jl |VA(1− jl)〉|. Clearly, σl ≤ 2|〈Oljl |VAjl〉|.
Moreover, we assume that σ0 + σ1 ≥ σ2 + σ3. If this is not the ase we ould satisfy this
ondition by altering the strategy A of Alie (by appropriate rotation of her basis) in suh a
way that the denitions of Hk and Hk+2 would swap leaving everything else unhanged.
We look now on the probability of obtaining the orret result by Alie. The probability p0
of Alie getting outome β = 0 in ase of β = 1 is at least
p0 ≥ 12 〈O0j0 |ρ0,1|O0j0〉+ 12 〈O0j0 |ρ1,1|O0j0〉 =
1
2 |〈O0j0 |v001〉 − 〈O0j0 |v010〉|2 + 12 |〈O0j0 |v001〉 − 〈O0j0 |v100〉|2
+12 |〈O0j0 |v110〉 − 〈O0j0 |v011〉|2 + 12 |〈O0j0 |v110〉 − 〈O0j0 |v101〉|2 .
So, by inequality |a− b|2 + |a− c|2 ≥ 12 |b− c|2 we get that
p0 ≥ 14 |〈O0j0 |v010〉 − 〈O0j0 |v100〉|2 + 14 |〈O0j0 |v011〉 − 〈O0j0 |v101〉|2
= 14 |〈O0j0 |VA0〉|2 + 14 |〈O0j0 |VA1〉|2 ≥ 116σ20 .
Similar alulation of the probability p1 of getting outome β = 1 in ase of β = 0 yields that
the probability of omputing wrong result is at least
Pr[β′ 6= β] = Pr[β ⊕m 6= ai] ≥ 1
16
(σ20 + σ
2
1) ≥
1
256
(
3∑
l=0
σl)
2.
Hene, the lemma holds for the ase a0 ⊕ a1 = 0.
Sine in ase of a0 ⊕ a1 = 1 the reasoning is ompletely analogous - we exhange only the
roles of |VS〉 and |VA〉 and Alie has to know the value of β ⊕ i in order to give the orret
answer to Bob, the proof is onluded.
To see that quadratial bound imposed by the above lemma an be met, onsider |Φ〉 =√
1− ε|000〉 + √ε|110〉. Intuitively, we label the symmetri and anti-symmetri part of |Φ〉
with 0 and 1. Let H2 = |01〉〈01|, H3 = 0. One an easily alulate that
ρ0,0 = (1 − ε)|00〉〈00| +
√
ε(1 − ε)(|00〉〈11| + |11〉〈00|) + ε|11〉〈11|
ρ1,0 = (1− ε)|00〉〈00| + ε|10〉〈10|
and therefore ||ρ0,0 − ρ1,0||t ≥
√
ε(1 − ε)− 2ε. So, by Theoren 1 there exists a measurement
{H0,H1} allowing us to distinguish between those two density matries with
√
ε(1− ε)− 2ε
auray and moreover H2,H3⊥H0,H1 sine tr(H2ρ0,0H†2) = tr(H2ρ1,0H†2) = 0. Now, let
M = {H0,H1,H2,H3} be Alie's measurement. To heat, we use the following strategy A
orresponding to her input a0 = a1 = 0. Alie sends |Φ〉 to Bob, after reeiving the qubit
bak she applies the measurement M . If the outome is H2 then she answers a0 ⊕ β = 1 to
6
Bob and sets i′ = 0 with probability 12 , in the other ase she sends a0 ⊕ β = 0 to Bob and
aording to the outome being 0 or 1 she sets i′ = 0 (i′ = 1).
To see that this strategy gives orret result with probability greater than 1 − ε we should
note that probability of outome H2 in ase of β = 0 is 0 and in ase of β = 1 is 1 − ε.
Therefore, sine β = 0 with probability 12 , our advantage in determining the input of Bob is
greater than
1
2
√
ε− 32ε.
3.2 Maliious Bob
Now, we analyze Bob's possibility of heating.
Lemma 3 Let Alie and Bob perform Protool 2. Assume Alie is honest and deposits bits
a0, a1, with Pr[ai = 0] = 1/2. Then for every strategy used by Bob and all values a
′
0, a
′
1 whih
Bob learns about a0, a1, it holds that: for all i ∈ {0, 1}
if Pra0,a1∈R{0,1}[a
′
i = ai] ≥ 1− ε2 then Pra0,a1∈R{0,1}[a′1−i = a1−i] ≤ 1/2 + 16
√
2ε.
Proof: Consider some maliious strategy B of Bob. Wlog we may assume that the probability
of a′0 = a0 is greater than the probability of a
′
1 = a1. Our aim is to show that
if Pra0,a1∈R{0,1}[a
′
0 6= a0] ≤ ε2 then Pra0,a1∈R{0,1}[a′1 = a1] ≤ 1/2 + 16
√
2ε.
Strategy B an be think of as a two step proess. First a unitary transformation U is ating on
|Φa0,a1,h〉 = |v〉⊗Rα|a1 ⊕ h〉⊗Rα|a0 ⊕ h〉, where v is an anillary state2. Next the last qubit
of U(|Φa0,a1,h〉) is sent to Alie3, she performs step 3 on these qubit and sends the lassial bit
m bak to Bob. Upon reeiving m, Bob exeutes the seond part of his attak: he performs
some arbitrary measurement {H0,H1,H2,H3}, where H0 (H1) orresponds to Bob's belief
that a0 = 0, a1 = 0 (resp. a0 = 0, a1 = 1) and H2 (H3) orresponds to a0 = 1 and a1 = 0
(resp. a0 = 1 and a1 = 1). In other words, outome orresponding to H2l+k implies a
′
0 = l
and a′1 = k.
The unitary transformation U an be desribed by a set of vetors {V l,jk } suh that U(|v〉 ⊗
|l, j〉) = |V l,j0 〉⊗|0〉+ |V l,j1 〉⊗|1〉. Or alternatively in diagonal basis, by a set of vetors {W l,jk }
suh that U(|v〉 ⊗ |l×, j×〉) = |W l,j0 〉 ⊗ |0×〉+ |W l,j1 〉 ⊗ |1×〉.
We present now, an intuitive, brief summary of the proof. Informally, we an think of U as
about some kind of disturbane of the qubit Rα|a0 ⊕ h〉 being sent bak to Alie. First, we
will show that in order to heat Bob's U has to aumulate after Step 2, till the end of the
protool, some information about the value of a0⊕h hidden in this qubit. On the other hand,
to get the proper result i.e. the value of a0, this qubit's atual information about enoded
value has to be disturbed at the smallest possible degree. That implies for Bob a neessity
of some sort of loning that qubit, whih turns out to impose the desired bounds on possible
heating. We show this by rst reduing the task of loning to one where no additional hint in
the form of Rα|a1 ⊕ h〉 is provided and then an analysis of this simplied proess. Therefore,
the proof indiates that the hardness of heating the protool is ontained in the neessity
of loning, whih gives us a sort of quantitative non-loning theorem. Although, it seems to
onern only our partiular implementation of the protool, we believe that this senario is
useful enough to be of independent interests.
2
Note that this does not restrit Bob's power. Partiularly, when Bob tries to make a measurement in the
rst step then using a standard tehnique we an move this measurement to the seond step.
3
We an assume wlog that the last qubit is sent sine U is arbitrary
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We analyze rst Bob's information gain about a1. Wlog we may assume that Bob an distin-
guish better between two values of a1 if a0 = 0. That is
Pra1∈R{0,1}[a
′
1 = a1|a0 = 0] ≥ Pra1∈R{0,1}[a′1 = a1|a0 = 1].
Let now ρj,k,l be a density matrix of the system before Bob's nal measurement, orresponding
to α = j · 12 , h = k, a1 = l and a0 = 0. The advantage δ of Bob in this ase (i.e. δ suh that
Pr[a′1 = a1 | a0 = 0] = 1/2 + δ) an be estimated by Lemma 1 by Bob's ability to distinguish
between the following density matries:
1
4(ρ0,0,0 + ρ1,0,0 + ρ0,1,0 + ρ1,1,0) (ase a1 = 0), and
1
4(ρ0,0,1 + ρ1,0,1 + ρ0,1,1 + ρ1,1,1) (ase a1 = 1).
Using the triangle inequality we get that for the measurement O performed by Bob
δ ≤ 1
8
(|ρO0,0,0 − ρO0,1,1|1 + |ρO1,1,0 − ρO1,0,1|1 + |ρO0,1,0 − ρO0,0,1|1 + |ρO1,0,0 − ρO1,1,1|1). (1)
Eah omponent orresponds to dierent values of α and h ⊕ a1. And eah omponent is
symmetri to the other in suh a way that there exists a straight-forward loal transformation
for Bob (i.e. appropriate rotation of the omputational basis on one or both qubits) whih
transform any of above omponents onto another. So, we an assume wlog that the advantage
in distinguishing between ρ0,0,0 and ρ0,1,1 δ0 = |ρO0,0,0 − ρO0,1,1|1 is the maximum omponent
in the right-hand side of the inequality (1) and therefore we have δ ≤ 12δ0. Let, for short,
γ0 = ρ0,0,0 and γ1 = ρ0,1,1. One an easily alulate that
γ0 = |0〉〈0| ⊗ |V 000 〉〈V 000 |+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |V 001 〉〈V 001 | (2)
γ1 = |0〉〈0| ⊗ |V 011 〉〈V 011 |+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |V 010 〉〈V 010 |. (3)
As we an see to eah value of m in above density matries orresponds a pair of vetors whih
are ritial for Bob's heating. I.e. the better they an be distinguishable by his measurement
the greater is his advantage. But, as we will see later, this fat introdues perturbation of the
indiation of the value of a0.
First, we take a look on the measurements H0, H1 performed by Bob. Let us dene σ2m+p
for p,m ∈ {0, 1} as follows
σ2m+p =


|tr(Hp|0V 0pp 〉〈0V 0pp |H†p)− tr(Hp|0V 0(1−p)1−p 〉〈0V 0(1−p)1−p |H†p)| if m = 0,
|tr(Hp|1V 0p1−p〉〈1V 0p1−p|H†p)− tr(Hp|1V 0(1−p)p 〉〈1V 0(1−p)p |H†p)| if m = 1.
Let for m = 0, p0 ∈ {0, 1} be suh that σp0 ≥ σ1−p0 and similarly, for m = 1 let p1 ∈ {0, 1}
be suh that σ2+p1 ≥ σ2+(1−p1). Then we get
|γO0 − γO1 |1 =
∑3
t=0 |tr(Htγ0H†t )− tr(Htγ1H†t )|
≤ 2(σp0 + σ2+p1) +
∑3
t=2 |tr(Htγ0H†t )− tr(Htγ1H†t )|.
We should see rst that the seond term in the above sum orresponds to advantage in
distinguishing between two values of a1 by measurement H2,H3 in ase of a0 = 0. But those
subspaes reet Bob's belief that a0 = 1. Therefore, we have that
3∑
t=2
|tr(Htγ0H†t )− tr(Htγ1H†t )| ≤ Pra0,a1∈R{0,1}[a′0 6= a0|a0 = 0].
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So, we an neglet this term beause it is of the order of the square of the advantage (if not
then our lemma would be proved). Hene we get:
δ0
2 ≤ σp0 + σ2+p1 .
Now, we dene projetion Om as follows. For m = 0 let O0 be the normalized orthogonal
projetion of |0V 0p0p0 〉 onto the subspae Hp0 if
tr(Hp0 |0V 0p0p0 〉〈0V 0p0p0 |H†p0) ≥ tr(Hp0|0V
0(1−p0)
1−p0 〉〈0V
0(1−p0)
1−p0 |H†p0).
Otherwise, let O0 be the normalized orthogonal projetion of |0V 0(1−p0)1−p0 〉 onto Hp0 . Analo-
gously, we dene O1 as a normalized orthogonal projetion of |1V 0p11−p1〉 onto the subspae Hp1
if
tr(Hp1|1V 0p11−p1〉〈1V
0p
1−p1 |H†p1) ≥ tr(Hp1 |1V 0(1−p1)p1 〉〈1V 0(1−p1)p1 |H†p1)
else O1 is a normalized orthogonal projetion of |1V 0(1−p1)p1 〉 onto Hp1 . Hene we get
σp0 ≤ ||〈0V 0p0p0 |O0〉|2 − |〈0V
0(1−p0)
1−p0 |O0〉|2|, σ2+p1 ≤ ||〈1V
0p1
1−p1 |O1〉|2 − |〈1V 0(1−p1)p1 |O1〉|2|.
We would like now to investigate the probability of obtaining the orret result. Reall that
Pr[a1 = 0] =
1
2 . We should rst note that the density matries orresponding to initial ong-
uration of the seond qubit Rα|a1 ⊕ h〉 is now exatly 12 |0〉〈0|+ 12 |1〉〈1| even if we know h and
α. So, from the point of view of the protool those two ongurations are indistinguishable.
Therefore, we an substitute the seond qubit from the initial onguration with a random bit
r enoded in perpendiular basis and the probability of obtaining proper result is unhanged.
We analyze the probability of omputing the orret result in ase of r = 0. Note, that the
vetors {V 0,jk }k,j still desribe U , but vetors {W 0jk }k,j are dierent, dened by U ating now
on initial onguration |v〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ Rα|j〉, with α = 12 . We investigate the orrespondene
between {V 0jk }k,j and the new vetors. For j = 0 we have:
U(|v00×〉) = 1√2U(|v00〉 − |v01〉) =
1√
2
(V 000 |0〉+ V 001 |1〉 − V 010 |0〉 − V 011 |1〉)
= 12((V
00
0 − V 001 − V 010 + V 011 )|0×〉+ (V 000 + V 001 − V 010 − V 011 )|1×〉)).
Similarly, for j = 1 we have:
U(|v01×〉) = 1√2U(|v00〉 + |v01〉) =
1√
2
(V 000 |0〉+ V 001 |1〉+ V 010 |0〉 + V 011 |1〉)
= 12((V
00
0 − V 001 + V 010 − V 011 )|0×〉+ (V 000 + V 001 + V 010 + V 011 )|1×〉)).
Thus, let us denote these vetors by
W˜ 000 =
1
2
((V 000 + V
01
1 )− (V 010 + V 001 )), W˜ 001 =
1
2
((V 000 − V 011 )− (V 010 − V 001 )),
W˜ 010 =
1
2
((V 000 − V 011 ) + (V 010 − V 001 )), W˜ 011 =
1
2
((V 000 + V
01
1 ) + (V
01
0 + V
00
1 )).
In order to obtain the orret result Bob has to distinguish between the density matries
orresponding to two values of a0. In partiular, he has to distinguish between density matries
γ′0, γ
′
1 orresponding to two possible values of a0 knowing that m = 0. These density matries
are:
γ′0 =
1
4
|0〉〈0| ⊗ (|V 000 〉〈V 000 |+ |V 011 〉〈V 011 |+ |W˜ 000 〉〈W˜ 000 |+ |W˜ 011 〉〈W˜ 011 |), (4)
γ′1 =
1
4
|0〉〈0| ⊗ (|V 010 〉〈V 010 |+ |V 001 〉〈V 001 |+ |W˜ 010 〉〈W˜ 010 |+ |W˜ 001 〉〈W˜ 001 |). (5)
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Now, the probability of failure i.e. the probability that in ase of m = 0 Bob's measurement
indiates that a0 = 0 if in fat it is a0 = 1, is at least
tr(Hp0γ
′
1H
†
p0
) ≥ tr(|O0〉〈O0|γ′1) =
1
4
(|〈0V 010 |O0〉|2+|〈0V 001 |O0〉|2+|〈0W˜ 010 |O0〉|2+|〈0W˜ 001 |O0〉|2).
But sine the fat that
W˜ 010 =
1
2
((V 000 − V 011 ) + (V 010 − V 001 )), W˜ 001 =
1
2
((V 000 − V 011 )− (V 010 − V 001 )),
and the parallelogram law (|a+ b|2 + |a− b|2 = 2|a|2 +2|b|2), we have that this probability is
at least
1
4(|〈0W˜ 010 |O0〉|2 + |〈0W˜ 001 |O0〉|2) ≥ 18 |〈0V 000 |O0〉 − 〈0V 011 |O0〉|2
≥ 132(|〈0V 000 |O0〉| − |〈0V 011 |O0〉|)2(|〈0V 000 |O0〉|+ |〈0V 011 |O0〉|)2
≥ 132 (|〈0V 000 |O0〉|2 − |〈0V 011 |O0〉|2)2 ≥
σ2p0
32 .
Similarly we analyze density matries γ′′0 , γ
′′
1 orresponding to two possible values of a0 know-
ing that m = 1. These density matries are equal to resp. γ′1 and γ
′
0 after hanging |0〉〈0| to
|1〉〈1|. Now, by repeating ompletely analogous estimation of failure's probability with usage
of vetors |V 010 〉, |V 001 〉, |W˜ 000 〉 and |W˜ 011 〉, we get that this probability is at least
σ22+p1
32 . There-
fore, sine the vetors involved in imposing failure in both ases are distint, we onlude that
Pra1∈R{0,1}[a
′
0 6= a0|r = 0] ≥
σ2p0
+σ2
2+p1
32 . Hene we have
Pra1∈R{0,1}[a
′
0 6= a0] = 12Pra1∈R{0,1}[a′0 6= a0|r = 0] + 12Pra1∈R{0,1}[a′0 6= a0|r = 1]
≥ σ
2
p0
+σ2
2+p1
64 ≥ δ
2
128
and the lemma is proved.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the value of m doesn't need to be orrelated in any way
with value of ai. That is, Bob by using entanglement (for instane, straightforward use of Bell
states) an make the value of m independent of ai and still aquire perfet knowledge about
ai. He uses simple error-orretion to know whether m = ai or m = 1−ai. His problems with
determining whether ip has ourred, start only when he wants additionally to aumulate
some information about the value of ai ⊕ h.
To see that this quadratial bound an be ahieved onsider the following heating strategy.
Let U∗ be suh that U∗(|v〉 ⊗ |l, j〉) = |vj〉 ⊗ |l, j〉. So, |V l,jj 〉 = |vj〉 ⊗ |l〉 and |V l,j1−j〉 = 0.
Moreover, let 〈v0|v1〉 =
√
1− ε. As we an see, usage of U∗ aumulates some information
about value of j = a0⊕h by marking it with two non-parallel (therefore possible to distinguish)
vetors in Bob's system. We do now the following. We use U∗ on |v〉⊗Rα|a1 ⊕ h〉⊕Rα|a0 ⊕ h〉
and send the last qubit to Alie. When we get the message m whih is exatly a0 with
probability
4
of order 1− ε, we make an optimal measurement to distinguish between v0 and
v1. By Theorem 1 this optimal measurement has advantage of order
√
ε. So, after getting the
outome j′, we know that Pr[j′ = a0 ⊕ h] ≥ 12 +Ω(
√
ε) and we an simply ompute the value
of h′ = m⊕j′. Having suh knowledge about the value of h′ we an distinguish between values
of a1 enoded in the seond qubit Rα|a1 ⊕ h〉 with the advantage proportional to Ω(
√
ε).
4
This an be easily omputed - the perturbation arises when α =
1
2
.
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4 Cheat Sensitive Quantum Bit Commitment
We reall rst a formal denition of the binding and sealing property of a quantum bit
ommitment. We follow here the denition by Aharonov et al. [2℄. Let us start with the
binding property. Assume Alie follows the bit ommitment protool and Bob is arbitrarily.
During the depositing phase Bob and Alie ompute in some rounds a super-position |ψAB〉
with two quantum registers: one keeping by Bob and one by Alie. After a ommuniation
phase Bob either uses a strategy trying to onvine Alie to 0 or a strategy to onvine
Alie to 1. Depending on the results of the omputations Alie deides to one the values
vB ∈ {0, 1, err}; In ase vB = err he rejets the protool. Let pi be the probability that
Alie deides vB = i, and perr be the probability that Alie deides vB = err, when Bob uses
strategy 0. Analogously, denote the probabilities q0, q1, qerr for Bob's strategy 1. A protool
is (δ, ε)-binding if whenever Alie is hones, for any Bob's strategy it is true: if perr, qerr ≤ ε
then |p0 − q0|, |p1 − q1| ≤ δ. A bit ommitment protool is (δ, ε)-sealing, if whenever Bob is
honest and deposits a bit b s.t. Pr[b = 0] = 1/2, for any Alie's strategy and a value c Alie
learns, it holds that: if Prb∈R{0,1}[Bob detets error] ≤ ε then Prb∈R{0,1}[c = b] ≤ 1/2 + δ.
The probability is taken over b taken uniformly from {0, 1} and the protool.
Theorem 3 Using Protool 2 as a blak-box for omputing OT, Protool 1 is an (4
√
ε, ε)-
sealing. Moreover, there exists a onstant λ > 0 suh that for all strategies Bob uses it holds
max{perr, qerr} > λ, where perr (qerr) denotes the probability that Alie deides error when
Bob uses strategy for 0 (1 resp.).
Sketh of the proof: First, we note that in both alls to the OT funtion the inputs that
ome into play in this exeutions are ompletely unorrelated from the point of view of both
Alie and Bob. So, we an analyze them distintly.
To see that this protool is sealing we note that Alie in eah all to OT funtion has to
take into aount that with probability
1
2 Bob will hek whether she knows what atu-
ally he has reeived during exeution of this protool. Moreover her heating is eetive
only if it is not heked, so only with probability of
1
2 . By Lemma 2, if a strategy al-
lows her to distinguish between possible values of b′ with advantage greater than 4 2
√
2ε then
Prb′∈R{0,1}[vc 6= OT ((a2c, a2c+1), b′)] ≥ ε.
In ase of binding, we rst notie that it is only useful for Bob to heat in some partiular
OT exeution, hosen previously by Bob, whih is used in the revealing phase for the binding
test. So wlog assume Bob heats in the seond OT exeution and that in the last step of the
depositing stage he reveals c = 0. Let a′3, a
′
4, resp. denote the predited values. Using the
notation given in the denition of the binding property we get that perr = Pr[a
′
3 6= a3], p0 =
Pr[a′3 = a3], and p1 = 0. Similarly we have qerr = Pr[a
′
4 6= a4], q0 = 0, and q1 = Pr[a′4 = a4].
Now by Lemma 3 we get that if Pr[a′i 6= ai] ≤ ε2 then Pr[a′1−i 6= a1−i] ≥ 1/2 − 162ε and for
some onstant λ > 0 it follows that max{Pr[a′i 6= ai],Pr[a′1−i 6= a1−i]} > λ.
5 Conluding Remark
In this paper a weak variant of quantum bit ommitment is investigated. We give quantum
bit ommitment sheme that is simultaneously binding and sealing and we show that if a
maliious Alie gains some information about the ommitted bit b then Bob detets this with
a probability Ω(ε2). When Bob heats then Alie's probability of deteting the heating is
greater than a onstant λ > 0. Using our bounds we get that the value is very small and an
interesting task would be to improve the onstant.
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